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Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments †
By Marco Battaglini, Salvatore Nunnari, and Thomas R. Palfrey *
We study the Markov equilibria of a model of free riding in which n 
infinitely lived agents choose between private consumption and irre-
versible contributions to a durable public good. We show that the set 
of equilibrium steady states converges to a unique point as deprecia-
tion converges to zero. For any level of depreciation, moreover, the 
highest steady state converges to the efficient level as agents become 
increasingly patient. These results are in contrast to the case with 
reversible investments, where a continuum of inefficient equilibrium 
steady states exists for any level of depreciation, discount factor,  and 
size of population. (JEL D11, H41)
The most significant kinds of free rider problems are characterized by two key 
features. First, they are dynamic. Public goods, for example, are often durable: it 
takes time to accumulate them and they depreciate slowly, projecting their ben-
efits for many years. Similarly, environmental problems depend on variables that 
slowly evolve over time like capital goods. In these examples, what matters for the 
agents in the economy is the stock of the individual contributions accumulated over 
time. Second, they are characterized by irreversibility. Major investments in public 
goods—such as bridges, roads, and military equipment—are not easily transformed 
into other forms of consumption; similarly, the effects of pollution are difficult or 
impossible to reverse. Although there is a large literature dedicated to free rider 
problems, surprisingly little is known about dynamic problems with irreversibility. 
How large are the inefficiencies in dynamic environments with irreversibility? How 
do the distortions with irreversibility compare to the distortions in static models and 
in dynamic models with reversibility? To date, these questions have been posed only 
for very specific environments, and never fully answered.
In this paper, we present a simple model of free riding to address these ques-
tions. In the model, n infinitely lived agents allocate their income between private 
consumption and contributions to a public good in every period. The public good is 
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durable and depreciates at a rate d. We study the properties of the Markov equilibria 
in which the public good is irreversible. We present three main results. First, we 
show that, for any group size and rate of depreciation, the steady state of the best 
Markov equilibrium converges to the efficient steady state as the agents’ discount 
factor converges to one. Second, as depreciation converges to zero, the set of steady 
states converges to a unique point. It follows that, when the discount factor is high 
and depreciation is low, all equilibrium steady states are close to efficient. Third, 
however, convergence to the steady state is inefficiently slow. From these results 
we draw two general conclusions on dynamic free rider games with irreversibil-
ity: (i) contrary to what happens with the more widely studied case with reversible 
investments, multiplicity of steady-state equilibria is not an issue when depreciation 
is small; (ii) the problem with dynamic free riding with irreversibility is not so much 
an inefficient steady state, but an inefficiently slow accumulation path.
These results are related to two strands of literature. First, they are related to the 
large literature on dynamic public good games with reversibility. As in our work, this 
literature has studied the inefficiencies arising in the Markov equilibria of dynamic 
public goods games. Contrary to our work, however, this literature has focused 
exclusively on environments with reversible investments.1 In contrast, our approach 
is general enough to allow sharp comparisons of equilibrium public good invest-
ments with and without reversibility. The comparisons we obtain show clearly that 
the irreversibility of investments is very important in modeling dynamic free rider 
problems. With reversibility, for any group size, discount factor, or rate of deprecia-
tion, there is always a continuum of equilibrium steady states, most of which are 
very inefficient. Irreversibility, therefore, has a beneficial effect on welfare because 
it eliminates the many inefficient equilibria that arise in economies with reversibility.
The second strand of literature to which our paper is related is the research on 
monotone contribution games, notably Lockwood and Thomas (2002) and Matthews 
(2013).2 In these papers, the techniques used to fully characterize subgame perfect 
equilibria require that players have a dominant strategy of zero contribution in the 
stage game and the depreciation rate is exactly zero. This literature has been focused 
on the comparison of the most efficient subgame perfect equilibria in economies with 
reversibility (when the actions can increase and decrease) and with irreversibility 
(when the actions cannot decrease), and it arrives at a conclusion that is essentially 
the opposite of ours. While we find that irreversibility is beneficial, its main finding 
is that, when the discount factor is sufficiently high, irreversibility always induces 
less efficient allocations because it limits the effectiveness of trigger strategies in 
punishing deviations. That conclusion, however, critically depends on the assump-
tion that players have a dominant strategy in the stage game of zero  contribution, 
1 Classic contributions include Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Fershtman and Nitzan (1991). More recent 
works include Dockner and Long (1993); Dutta and Radner (2004); Rubio and Casino (2002); Battaglini and Coate 
(2007); and Besley and Persson (2011). The last two papers have studied dynamic public good games in which 
investments are chosen in a collective decision-making process.
2 A number of important papers in the monotone games literature are less directly related. These papers require 
additional assumptions which make their environments hard to compare to ours. Gale (2001) studies games in 
which agents care only about the limit contributions as t → ∞. Admati and Perry (1991); Compte and Jehiel 
(2004); and Marx and Matthews (2000) consider environments in which the benefit of the contribution occurs at 
the end of the game if a threshold is reached and in which players receive either partial or no benefit from interim 
contributions. The first two of these papers, moreover, assume that players contribute sequentially, one at a time, so 
the game form is different.
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and that the rate of depreciation of the state variable is exactly zero. As we prove in 
Section IV, when depreciation is positive, even if arbitrarily small, subgame perfect 
equilibria are not sufficiently restrictive to allow a clear comparison of economies 
with and without irreversibility.
As a methodological contribution, the paper develops a novel approach to charac-
terize the Markov equilibria that may have more general applicability in the analysis 
of stochastic games with discrete time. The idea is to construct pure strategies that 
induce an objective function with a flat top: the flat region makes the players indif-
ferent between different rates of accumulation. This provides additional freedom in 
choosing the players’ reaction functions that is essential in proving existence of a 
pure strategy Markov equilibrium.
I. The Model
Consider an economy with n agents. There are two goods: a private good x and 
a public good g. The level of consumption of the private good by agent i in period 
t is  x t i, the level of the public good in period t is  g t . An allocation is an infinite 
nonnegative sequence z = ( x ∞ ,  g ∞ ), where  x ∞ = ( x 1 1, … ,  x 1 n, … ,  x t 1 , … ,  x t n , …) and 
 g ∞ = ( g 1 , … ,  g t , …). We refer to  z t = ( x t ,  g t ) as the allocation in period t. The utility 
U j of agent j is a function of  z j = ( x ∞ j ,  g ∞ ), where  x ∞ j = ( x 1 j , … ,  x t j, …). We assume 
that  U j can be written as  U j ( z j ) =  ∑ t=1 ∞  δ t−1  [  x t j + u( g t ) ] , where u( · ) is continu-
ously twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave on [0, ∞), with 
li m g→ 0 +  u′ (g) = ∞ and li m g→+∞  u′ (g) = 0. The future is discounted at a rate δ. There 
is a linear technology by which the private good can be used to produce the public 
good, with a marginal rate of transformation p = 1. The private consumption good is 
nondurable, the public good is durable, and the stock of the public good depreciates 
at a rate d ∈ [0, 1] between periods. Thus, if the level of public good at time t − 1 is 
g t−1 and the total investment in the public good is  I t , then the level of public good at 
time t will be  g t = (1 − d ) g t−1 +  I t .
In an Irreversible Investment Economy (IIE) the public policy in period t is required 
to satisfy three feasibility conditions: (i)  x t j  ≥  0  ∀j,  ∀t; (ii)  g t   ≥  (1 − d ) g t−1   ∀t; (iii)  I t +  ∑ j=1 n  x t j ≤ W  ∀t, where W is the aggregate per period level of resources in 
the economy. The first condition guarantees that private allocations are nonnegative. 
The second condition is the irreversibility condition, and is equivalent to  I t ≥ 0 ∀t. 
In contrast, a Reversible Investment Economy (RIE) is an economy where the sec-
ond constraint is replaced by  g t ≥ 0, so  I t can be negative. We compare IIE to RIE 
in Section IV.
It is convenient to distinguish the state variable at t,  g t−1 , from the policy choice 
g t and to reformulate the budget condition. If we denote  y t = (1 − d ) g t−1 +  I t as the 
new level of public good after investing  I t in the current period when the last period’s 
level of the public good is  g t−1 , then the public policy in period t can be repre-
sented by a vector (  y t ,  x t 1 , … ,  x t n ). Substituting  y t , the budget balance constraint  I t + 
 ∑ j=1 n  x t j ≤ W can be rewritten as  ∑ j=1 n  x t j +  [  y t − (1 − d ) g t−1 ] ≤ W. With this nota-
tion, we must have  x t ≥ 0,  y t ≥ (1 − d ) g t−1 in an IIE.
The initial stock of public good is  g 0 ≥ 0, exogenously given. Public policies are 
chosen as in the classic free rider problem, modeled by a voluntary contribution 
game. In period t, each agent j is endowed with  w t j = W/n units of private good. We 
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assume that each agent has full property rights over a share of the endowment (W/n) 
and in each period chooses on its own how to allocate its endowment between an 
individual contribution to the stock of public good (which is shared by all agents) 
and private consumption, taking as given the strategies of the other agents. The indi-
vidual contribution by agent j at time t is denoted  i t j and in an irreversible investment 
economy we require  i t j ∈  [ 0, W/n ] ∀j. The total  economy-wide increase in the stock 
of the public good in any period is then given by the sum of the agents’ individual 
contributions.3
To study the properties of the dynamic free rider problem described above, we 
study symmetric Markov perfect equilibria, where all agents use the same strategy, 
and these strategies are time-independent functions of the state, g.4 A strategy is 
a pair (x( · ), i( · )), where x(g) is an agent’s level of consumption and i(g) is an 
agent’s contribution to the stock of public good in state g. Given these strategies, by 
symmetry, the stock of public good in state g is y(g) = (1 − d )g + ni(g). For the 
remainder of the paper we refer to y(g) as the investment function. Associated with 
any Markov perfect equilibrium of the game is a value function, v(g), which speci-
fies the expected discounted future payoff to an agent when the state is g. An equi-
librium is continuous if the investment function, y(g), and the value function, v(g), 
are both continuous in g. In the remainder of the paper we will focus on continuous 
equilibria. In the following we refer to equilibria with the properties described above 
simply as equilibria.
We are interested in studying the long-term properties of the allocation. Given an 
equilibrium  ( y(g), v(g) ) , an allocation  y o is a steady state if it is a fixed point of the 
investment function:  y o = y(  y o ). A steady state  y o is said to be stable if there is a 
neighborhood  N ε (  y o ) of  y o such that for any  N  ε ′  (  y o ) ⊆  N ε (  y o ), g ∈  N  ε ′  (  y o ) implies 
y(g) ∈  N  ε ′  (  y o ). Intuitively, starting in a neighborhood of a stable steady state, g 
remains in a neighborhood of a stable steady state for all future periods. In what 
follows we will focus only on steady states that are stable and we will refer to stable 
steady states simply as steady states. We say that convergence to a steady state is 
gradual if it is not reached in finite time starting from a left neighborhood of it. We 
say that convergence is monotonic if the state converges monotonically to the steady 
state.
II. The Planner’s Problem
As a benchmark with which to compare the equilibrium allocations, we first ana-
lyze the sequence of public policies that would be chosen by a utilitarian planner. 
The planner’s solution is extremely simple in the environment described in the pre-
vious section: this feature will help to highlight the subtlety of the strategic interac-
tion studied in the next two sections.
3 The state variable in our model can have alternative interpretations. For example, one may think of g as physical 
public capital, which seems natural to assume is irreversible. Once a bridge is constructed, it cannot be demolished 
and costlessly transformed back to consumption. But we have in mind a more general interpretation. In some appli-
cations g could represent social capital or certain aspects of aggregate human capital (literacy rates, for example). 
The key aspect of g is its durability.
4 We study the subgame perfect equilibria of the game in Section IV where we compare the predictions in the 
two equilibrium concepts.
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The planner’s problem has a recursive representation in which g is the state vari-
able and  v P (g), the planner’s value function, can be represented as:
(1)  v P (g) =  max y, x 
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
 ∑ 
j=1
n
  x i + nu( y) + δ v P ( y)
⎫⎪⎪⎬ .⎪⎪⎭
s.t.  ∑ 
j=1
n
  x i + y − (1 − d )g ≤ W,  x i ≥ 0 ∀i, y ≥ (1 − d )g
By standard methods (see Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott 1989), we can show that 
a continuous, strictly concave, and differentiable  v P (g) that satisfies (1) exists 
and is unique. The optimal policies have an intuitive characterization. When the 
accumulated level of public good is low, the marginal benefit of increasing y is 
high, and the planner finds it optimal to spend as much as possible on building 
the stock of public good: in this region of the state space  y P (g) = W + (1 − d )g 
and  ∑ j=1 n  x i = 0. When g is high, the planner will be able to reach the level of 
public good  y P ∗ (δ, d, n) that solves the planner’s unconstrained problem: i.e., 
n u′ (  y P ∗ (δ, d, n)) + δ  v P ′ (  y P ∗ (δ, d, n)) = 1. Applying the envelope theorem, we can 
show that at the interior solution  y P ∗ (δ, d, n) we have  v P ′ (  y P ∗ (δ, d, n)) = 1 − d. It 
follows that  y P ∗ (δ, d, n) =  [  u′ ] −1  ( 1 − δ(1 − d )_ n ) . The investment function has the 
following simple structure. If (1 − d )g <  (  y P ∗ (δ, d, n) − W ) , then  y P ∗ (δ, d, n) is 
not feasible: the planner spends W on the public good so  y P (g) = (1 − d )g + W. 
If (1 − d )g ∈  [   y P ∗(δ, d, n) − W,  y P ∗ (δ, d, n) ] , instead, the planner can choose 
 y P (g) =  y P ∗ (δ, d, n) without violating the constraints. If (1 − d )g >  y P ∗ (δ, d, n), 
then the irreversibility constraint is binding and  y P (g) = (1 − d )g.
This investment function implies that the planner’s economy converges to one 
of two possible steady states. If W/d ≤  y P ∗ (δ, d, n), then the rate of depreciation 
is so high that the planner cannot reach  y P ∗ (δ, d, n) (except temporarily if the 
initial state is sufficiently large). In this case the steady state is  y P o = W/d, and 
the planner invests all resources in all states on the equilibrium path. If W/d > 
y P ∗ (δ, d, n),  y P ∗ (δ, d, n) is sustainable as a steady state. In this case, in the steady 
state  y P o =  y P ∗ (δ, d, n), and the (per agent) level of private consumption is positive: 
 x P ∗(δ, d, n) =  ( W + (1 − d )g −  y P ∗ (δ, d, n) ) /n > 0. For the rest of the paper, we 
assume that W/d >  y P ∗ (δ, d, n). The analysis in the other case is similar.
III. Equilibrium with Irreversibility
In contrast to the planner’s solution, in equilibrium no agent can directly choose 
the stock of public good y: an agent (say j ) chooses only his own level of private 
consumption x and the level of its own contribution to the stock of public good. 
The agent realizes that in any period, given g and the other agents’ level of private 
consumption, her contribution ultimately determines y. It is therefore as if agent j 
chooses x and y, subject to three feasibility constraints. The first constraint is a 
resource constraint that specifies the level of the public good y = W + (1 − d )g − 
[ x + (n − 1)x(g) ] . This constraint requires that the stock of public good y equals total 
resources, W + (1 − d )g, minus the sum of private consumptions, x + (n − 1)x(g). 
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The function x(g) is the equilibrium per capita level; naturally, the agent takes the 
equilibrium level of the other players, (n − 1)x(g), as given. The second constraint 
requires that private consumption x is nonnegative. The third requires total consump-
tion nx to be no larger than total resources W. Agent j’s problem can therefore be 
written as:
(2)  max 
y, x 
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
x + u( y) + δ v ( y) ⎫⎪⎬ ,⎪⎭
s.t. x + y − (1 − d )g = W − (n − 1) x (g)
W − (n − 1) x (g) + (1 − d )g − y ≥ 0, and x ≤ W/n
where v(g) is his equilibrium value function.
In a symmetric equilibrium, all agents consume the same fraction of resources, 
so agent j can assume that in state g the other agents each consume x(g) 
=  [ W + (1 − d )g − y(g) ] /n, where y(g) is the equilibrium investment function. 
Substituting the first constraint of (2) in the objective function, recognizing that 
agent j takes the strategies of the other agents as given, and ignoring constant terms, 
the agent’s problem can be written as:
(3)  max 
y
 
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
u( y) − y + δ v ( y) ⎫⎪⎬ .⎪⎭y ≤  
W + (1 − d )g
  _n  +  n − 1 _n  y (g), y ≥  
(1 − d )g
 _n  +  n − 1 _n  y (g)
To interpret the second constraint, note that it can be written as y ≥ (1 − d )g + 
 n − 1 _n   [  y(g) − (1 − d )g ] : the new level of public good cannot be lower than (1 − d )g 
plus the investments from all the other agents (in a symmetric equilibrium, an indi-
vidual investment is  [  y (g) − (1 − d )g ] /n). Similarly, the first constraint can be 
written as y ≤ (1 − d )g +  n − 1 _n   [  y (g) − (1 − d )g ] + W/n: the new level of public 
good can not be larger than (1 − d )g, plus the investments from all the other agents, 
plus the maximal individual contribution W/n.
A continuous symmetric Markov equilibrium is fully described in this environment 
by two functions: an aggregate investment function y (g), and an associated value 
function v (g). The aggregate investment function y (g) must solve (3) given v (g). The 
value function v (g) must be consistent with the agents’ strategies, so, for all g:
(4)  v (g) =  W + (1 − d ) g − y (g)  __ n  + u  ( y (g) ) + δ v  ( y (g) ) .
An equilibrium in an Irreversible Investment Economy is a pair of functions, y ( · ) and 
v ( · ), such that for all g ≥ 0, y (g) solves (3) given the value function v ( · ), and for all 
g ≥ 0, v (g) solves (4) given y (g). For a given value function, if an equilibrium exists, 
the problem faced by an agent looks apparently similar to the problem of the planner, 
but with two important differences. First, in the objective function the agent does not 
internalize the effect of the public good on the other agents. This is the classic free 
rider problem, present in static models as well: it induces a  suboptimal investment in 
g. The second difference with respect to the planner’s problem is that the agent takes 
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the current and future contributions of the other agents as given. The incentives to 
invest depend on the agent’s expectations about the other agents’ current and future 
contributions, which are captured implicitly by the investment function y (g).
To understand the complications associated with constructing an equilibrium with 
irreversibility, consider what happens when the irreversibility constraint becomes bind-
ing in an economy with zero depreciation. Suppose first that, as in the planner’s prob-
lem, the value function is strictly concave. In this case the investment function looks 
very much like the planner’s investment function. The agents find it optimal to invest 
as much as possible until the unconstrained optimum is feasible, say  y o ; and then they 
find it optimal to stay constant at this level until the irreversibility constraint becomes 
binding: y (g) =  y o for g ≤  y o , so  y o is the steady state. The binding irreversibility con-
straint, however, forces the agent to choose a higher level of public good on the right of 
 y o : y (g) = g >  y o for g >  y o . Because of the free rider problem,  y o is strictly lower than 
the efficient level: the players recognize that any increase in their investment crowds 
out the other players’ investments in the following periods and so they underinvest. 
The irreversibility constraint acts as a beneficial commitment device and limits the 
ability of other players to eat additional investments. A marginal increase in g is more 
valuable on the right than on the left of the steady state  y o . However, this generates a 
contradiction since  y o would be suboptimal: by marginally increasing g at  y o the agents 
obtain a higher utility. In equilibrium we must have that the rate of investment on the 
right and on the left of the point at which the irreversibility constraint is binding are the 
same. The investment function therefore must be tangent to the irreversibility constraint 
y = g, as in the equilibrium represented in Figure 1. Satisfying this smooth pasting 
condition, however, is impossible with a strictly concave objective function because it 
requires that the agents are willing to invest at a sufficiently high speed on the left of  y o 
to guarantee that  y′ (g) = 1 at the point of contact with the irreversibility constraint. The 
challenge is to construct equilibria with this property.
In what follows, we proceed in two steps.  First, to prove existence of an equilibrium 
we construct equilibria in which the value function has a flat top, as for example in 
Figure 1.  We then prove that there is no loss of generality in focusing on this particular 
class in order to study the set of equilibrium steady states when depreciation in suf-
ficiently low. 
In an equilibrium in which the objective function has a flat region the investment 
function may take a more general form than the planner’s solution. Figure 1 repre-
sents a typical equilibrium when d = 0 to illustrate the logic of the construction. The 
equilibrium investment function takes the following form:
(5) y (g) = 
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
min  { W + g,  ˜  y  ( g 2 ) } g <  g 2 
 ˜  y (g) g ∈  [  g 2 ,  y o ] ,
g g ≥  y o 
where equilibrium investment is characterized by two critical levels,  g 2 ,  y o and an 
investment function  ˜  y(g), which is a nondecreasing function with values in  [ g, W + g ] . 
To see why y (g) may take the form of (5), consider Figure 1. The right panel of the 
figure illustrates a canonical equilibrium investment function. The steady state is 
labeled  y o in the figure, the point at which the (bold) investment  function intersects 
2865battaglini et al.: dynamic free riding with irreversible investmentsvOl. 104 nO. 9
the (dotted) diagonal. The left panel graphs the corresponding objective function, 
u(y) − y + δ v( y). For g <  g 1 , the objective function of (3) is strictly increasing in y and 
resources are insufficient to reach the level that maximizes the unconstrained objective 
function.5 In this case it is optimal to invest all resources: y (g) = W + g in g ≤  g 1 . 
For g >  y o , the objective function is decreasing. The agents would like to reduce g, 
but the irreversibility constraint is binding, so y(g) = g. For intermediate levels of 
g ∈  [  g 1 ,  y o ] , an interior level of investment y ∈  ( g 2 ,  y o ) is chosen. This is possible 
because the objective function is flat in this region: an agent is indifferent between any 
y ∈  [  g 2 ,  y o ] . In the example of Figure 1, agents choose y (g) =  ˜  y( g 2 ) in g ∈  [  g 1 ,  g 2 ] , 
and the increasing function  ˜  y(g) in y ∈  [  g 2 ,  y o ] . The key observation here is that since 
the objective function has a flat region, the agents are willing to choose an increasing 
investment function in  [  g 2 ,  y o ] that is tangent to the irreversibility constraint.
Can we construct an investment function that makes the value function flat on 
top and that also satisfies the equilibrium conditions? For an investment curve as in 
Figure 1 to be an equilibrium, we need to make sure that the agents are indifferent 
between investing and consuming for all states in  [  g 2 ,  y o ] . If this condition does not 
hold, the agents do not find it optimal to choose an interior level y (g). The marginal 
utility of investment is zero if and only if
(6)   u′ (g) + δ  v′ (g) − 1 = 0 ∀g ∈  [  g 2 ,  y o ] .
Since the value function is (4), in the general case with d ≥ 0 we have
(7)   v′ (g) =  1 − d −  y′ (g)  _n  +  u′  ( y (g) ) y′ (g) + δ  v′  ( y (g) ) y′ (g) .
Substituting this formula in (6), we see that the investment function y (g) must solve 
the following differential equation in [  g 2 ,  y o ]:
(8)   1 −  u′ (g) _δ  =  
1 − d −  y′ (g)  _n  +  u′  ( y (g) ) y′ (g) + δ  v′  ( y(g) ) y′ (g) .
5 In Figure 1 it is assumed that we have W + g ≥  g 2 only for g ≥  g 1 , so the agent can afford to choose a level of 
y that maximizes the objective function  ( i.e., y ∈  [  g 2 ,  g 3 ] ) if and only if g ≥  g 1 .
g1 g2g2
u(y) + δv(y) − y
g1 yo g g
gv y
45°
yo
y˜(g)
y(g)
y˜(g2)
W + g
Figure 1. An Example of Flat Top Equilibrium with No Depreciation
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This condition is useful only if we eliminate the last (endogenous) term: 
δ  v′ ( y (g)) y′ (g). To see why this is possible, note that y (g) is in  [  g 2 ,  y o ] for any 
g ∈  ( g 2 ,  y o ) in the example of Figure 1. In this case, (6) implies δ  v′ ( y (g)) = 1 − 
u′ ( y (g)). Substituting this condition in (8) we obtain the following necessary 
condition:
(9)   y′ (g) =  1 − d −  
n  ( 1 −  u′ (g) ) _ δ   _  
1 − n  .
Condition (9) shows that there is a unique way to specify the shape of the invest-
ment function that is consistent with a flat objective function in equilibrium. This 
necessary condition, however, leaves considerable freedom to construct multiple 
equilibria; (9) defines a simple differential equation with a solution  ˜  y (g) unique 
up to a constant. An equilibrium  ˜  y (g) is pinned down when we impose the smooth 
pasting condition discussed above. Using (9), it can be verified that  y′ (g) = 1 at 
g =  [  u′ ] −1 (1 − δ ). The tangency condition y (  y o ) =  y o provides the initial condition 
for the differential equation (9), and so uniquely defines  ˜  y (g) in (5). The dashed line 
in Figure 1 represents this function.
The following proposition proves that an equilibrium exists for any d ≥ 0 and 
indeed a continuum of equilibria exist for d > 0 (when d = 0 the upper and lower 
bounds of the equilibrium steady states in Proposition 1 coincide).6
ProPoSITIoN 1: For any d, δ, n and  y o   ∈   [  [  u′ ] −1  ( 1  −  δ (1  −  d ) ) , 
 [ u′ ] −1  ( 1 − δ(1 −  d _ n ) ) ] , there is an equilibrium with steady state  y o in an irrevers-
ible economy. In all these equilibria convergence is monotonic and gradual.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, for any d > 0 and δ < 1, all equilibria in Proposition 1 
are inefficient: first, the steady state is below optimum  y P ∗ (δ, d, n) (defined in 
Section III); second, convergence is inefficiently slow since convergence is in finite 
time in the planner’s solution. The first type of inefficiency, however, disappears in 
the best Markov equilibrium as players become patient since the upper bound of the 
set characterized in Proposition 1 converges to the planner’s first best:
CorollAry 1: For any d and n, the steady state in the most efficient equilibrium 
of an irreversible economy converges to the efficient level as δ → 1.
Corollary 1 does not put bounds on the equilibrium set and so on potential inef-
ficiencies in other equilibria. In the next result we show that multiplicity disappears 
as depreciation converges to zero.  let  
_ y IR (δ, d, n) and  y _ IR (δ, d, n) be the supremum 
and the infimum of the set of equilibrium steady states. We have:
ProPoSITIoN 2: For any δ and n, we have that  |   _ y IR (δ, d, n) −  y _ IR (δ, d, n) | → 0 
as d → 0. Moreover, there is a  _ d > 0 such that for d <  _ d , all equilibrium paths are 
gradual.
6 The details of the proofs of Proposition 1 and all the following results are in the online Appendix.
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The first part of Proposition 2 shows that when depreciation is small, there is a 
small set of feasible equilibrium steady states. Indeed, the set of steady states con-
verges to a singleton as depreciation converges to zero. This is a property entirely 
due to irreversibility since, as we discuss in the next section, with reversibility there 
is a continuum of equilibria for any level of depreciation (and for any δ and n as 
well). The second point shows that equilibria must look alike also in terms of the 
convergence path when d is sufficiently small: in all of them, convergence is gradu-
al.7 This also is a property that is due to the irreversibility constraint, since in revers-
ible economies we can have convergence in finite time, as we show below.
IV. Two Comparisons
In this section we discuss two natural comparisons to put the results of 
Propositions 1 and 2 in perspective. First, we compare the equilibrium sets with and 
without irreversibility; second, we compare Markov to subgame perfect equilibria.
A. Irreversible versus Reversible Economies
In economies with reversibility (rIE) the agents can choose a negative level of 
investment and so the public good can be reduced below (1 − d ) g t . The feasibil-
ity constraints defining the economy become: (i)  x t j ≥ 0 ∀j, ∀t; (ii)  y t ≥ 0; and (iii)  ∑ j=1 n  x t j +  [  y t − (1 − d ) g t−1 ] ≤ W  ∀t. In Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2012) 
we characterize the symmetric equilibria of the dynamic free rider game in these 
economies assuming that the agents withdraw up to 1/n of the accumulated stock. let 
 
_ y R (δ, d, n) and  y _R (δ, d, n) be the upper and lower bounds of the set of steady 
states in a rIE. In Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2012) we show that  _ y R (δ, d, n) =  [  u′ ] −1 ( 1 − δ  ( 1 − d/n ) ) and  y _R (δ, d, n) ≤  [  u′ ] −1 ( 1 − δ (1 − d )/n ) . This allows 
a neat comparison with the equilibria in an irreversible economy. let  E R and  E IR be 
the sets of equilibrium steady states respectively with and without reversibility. The 
following result is an immediate implication of Propositions 1–2:
ProPoSITIoN 3: For any δ and n, there is a  _ d > 0 such that  E IR ⊂  E R for all 
d <  _ d . Moreover,  |  y _ IR (δ, d, n) −  _ y R (δ, d, n) | → 0 as d → 0.
Proposition 3 makes clear that irreversibility has two effects. First, it reduces the 
set of equilibrium steady states, that with irreversibility is strictly included in the set 
with reversibility if depreciation is sufficiently small. Second, and more importantly, 
the irreversibility constraint eliminates the inefficient equilibria. When the economy 
is reversible, there are always very inefficient equilibria, with steady states not larger 
than  [  u′ ] −1 ( 1 − δ (1 − d )/n ) that are worse than the steady states reached by an 
agent in autarky (that is, alone by herself). on the other hand, as d → 0, the lower 
bound of the steady states with irreversibility converges to the upper bound of the set 
7 The property that the convergence path is gradual has been highlighted as a general feature of subgame perfect 
equilibria with irreversibility by lockwood and Thomas (2002). As we prove in Proposition 3, their result requires 
an assumption that d is exactly zero. When d > 0, graduality of the equilibrium path is not a general feature of 
subgame perfect equilibria.
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with reversibility. In addition to these two effects, Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey 
(2012) show that with reversibility there is always an (inefficient) equilibrium in 
which convergence to the steady state is not gradual. This shows that graduality is a 
feature associated to irreversibility.
The fact that reversibility affects so much of the equilibrium set may appear sur-
prising. In a planner’s solution the irreversibility constraint is irrelevant: it affects 
neither the steady state (that is unique) nor the convergence path.8 Even in econo-
mies with irreversibility, the irreversibility constraint is typically never binding on 
the equilibrium path starting from a low level of g (see Figure 1 for example). The 
reason why irreversibility is so important in a dynamic free rider game is precisely 
the fact that equilibrium investments are inefficiently low and the irreversibility con-
straint may limit the inefficiency by acting as a commitment device. The intuition is 
as follows. In the equilibria of a dynamic free rider problem, both with and without 
irreversibility, the agents hold back their individual contributions for fear that they 
will crowd out the contributions of other players, or even be appropriated by other 
agents in future periods. In economies with irreversibility, however, the irreversibil-
ity constraint limits the ability of the agents to appropriate the accumulated public 
good. In general, the irreversibility constraint is binding only for states that are so 
high that they are not reached on the equilibrium path; still, the fact that in these 
states free riding will be limited affects the entire equilibrium investment function. 
In states just below the point in which the constraint is binding, the agents know 
that the constraint will not allow the other agents to reduce the public good when it 
passes the threshold. These incentives induce higher investments and a higher value 
function, with a ripple effect on the entire investment function.
B. Subgame Perfect Equilibria versus Markov Equilibrium
Previous to our work, the effects of irreversibility have been studied in the lit-
erature on monotone games, in particular by Lockwood and Thomas (2002) and 
Matthews (2013).9 Both papers make two key assumptions: (i) a zero contribution is 
a dominant strategy for all players, and so the game can be reduced to a repeated ver-
sion of a prisoners’ dilemma game;10 (ii) the state variable g can only stay constant 
or increase because depreciation is exactly zero. Under these conditions Lockwood 
and Thomas (2002) have characterized the most efficient subgame perfect equilib-
rium (SPE) and Matthews (2013) has characterized all SPE.11 This  literature arrives 
at a conclusion that is opposite to ours: while we show irreversibility has a positive 
8 Assuming the initial state  g 0 is smaller than the steady state, on the convergent path the stock of public good is 
never reduced; it keeps increasing until the steady state is reached, and then it stops. The irreversibility constraint 
is, thus, never binding on the equilibrium path.
9 See footnote 2 for other important contributions in the monotone games literature that are not as closely related 
to our paper.
10 In our model we assume standard preferences u(g) satisfying the Inada condition ( u′ (g) → ∞ as g → 0 and 
 u′ (g) → 0 as g → ∞). In this case the dominant strategy assumption is never satisfied since the players find it opti-
mal to make strictly positive contributions, no matter what the other players do.
11 Matthews (2013) presents the most general analysis of monotone games to date. Although Matthews does not 
allow for depreciation, his model assumes very general specifications for the players’ preferences and makes weak 
assumptions on the timing of contributions. For this general version of the model, Matthews provides a necessary 
condition for a SPE; however, for a characterization of the SPE, this requires the same assumptions as in Lockwood 
and Thomas (2002).
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welfare effect, they show it has a negative effect. They prove that SPE in economies 
with irreversibility are more inefficient than in economies with reversibility, at least 
when agents are sufficiently patient. This finding is shown by proving an Anti-Folk 
Theorem: with reversibility, the efficient allocation is achievable in a SPE for a suf-
ficiently high discount factor (but less than one); with irreversibility, SPE are inef-
ficient for all δ < 1.12 This literature has also stressed the conclusion that the most 
efficient equilibrium path is characterized by gradualism (and hence inefficiently 
slow) if and only if the investment is irreversible. The central new finding in this 
literature is the fact that any comparison at all can be made focusing on the large 
set of subgame perfect equilibria. This is interesting because the set of SPE is not 
generally very informative in games with perfect information for reasons similar to 
standard folk theorems for repeated games.
With this background, we next compare the most efficient SPE paths in RIE and 
IIE under the assumptions of our model, allowing a positive (but possibly arbitrarily 
small) rate of depreciation. We say that an investment path is a SPE path if it coin-
cides with the equilibrium path of a SPE.
PROPOSITION 4: For any d > 0 and n > 1, there is a  _ δ < 1 such that the most effi-
cient SPE path in a RIE and the most efficient SPE path in an IIE both coincide with 
the Pareto efficient investment path for all δ >  _ δ . Hence, neither the most efficient 
SPE path in a RIE nor the most efficient SPE path in an IIE are characterized by 
gradualism for all δ >  _ δ .
Proposition 4 makes clear that the results on the effects of the irreversibility 
constraint obtained in the literature on monotone games critically depend on the 
assumption that depreciation is exactly zero; they can not be interpreted as results 
describing economies with a small—perhaps arbitrarily small—degree of depre-
ciation, because when depreciation is not zero, results are qualitatively different.13 
Perhaps more seriously, Proposition 4 suggests that when d > 0 a comparison 
between the most efficient SPE in RIE and IIE with patient players is no longer 
insightful, since the efficient allocation is an equilibrium in both environments.
To see why the rate of depreciation is so important, consider for simplicity the 
environment in Lockwood and Thomas (2002), where a zero contribution is a domi-
nant strategy (an assumption that is not used in the proof of Proposition 4).14 When 
d = 0, the worst punishment for an agent is that all other agents stop making contri-
butions, which is always the worst equilibrium by assumption (since zero contribu-
tion is a dominant strategy). But with d = 0 this punishment becomes increasingly 
irrelevant as g approaches the efficient steady state; in the worst case, a deviation is 
punished by an allocation that remains forever close to the efficient allocation. This 
12 The intuition behind this result is that irreversibility limits the ability of agents to punish each other; in the worst 
continuation equilibrium players stop making contributions, but they can not eat or destroy the accumulated state g.
13 Lockwood and Thomas’s (2002) result can be extended to the case of arbitrarily small amounts of deprecia-
tion, but only if the order of limits is reversed, i.e., by fixing δ and taking d to zero. Thus, it is always possible to find 
a sequence  d  n ,  δ  n converging to {0, 1} such that the efficient allocation path is a SPE path for any n both in a RIE 
and in an IIE: it follows that, for low d and high δ, a sharp comparison between the two is not possible.
14 For consistency, Proposition 4 is stated under the assumptions described in Section II according to which play-
ers do not have a dominant strategy. The strategy of our proof can be immediately adapted (in a simplified form) to 
the environment considered by Lockwood and Thomas (2002).
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is the reason why irreversibility makes it impossible to obtain an efficient allocation 
in Lockwood and Thomas (2002). The environment is very different if d is positive, 
even if arbitrarily small. In this case, after a deviation, the state would gradually 
decline and it would eventually approach zero. This convergence may certainly be 
slow when d is small; but as δ → 1 only the long run matters, so the punishment for a 
deviation is sufficiently high to induce all players to make the efficient contribution.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a simple model of free riding in which n infinitely 
lived agents choose between private consumption and contributions to a durable pub-
lic good. We study the properties of the Markov equilibria in which contributions to 
the public good are irreversible. We present three main results. First, we show that, 
no matter what the depreciation rate is, the steady state of the best Markov equi-
librium converges to the efficient level as the agents’ discount factor converges to 
one. Second, as depreciation converges to zero, the set of steady states converges to 
a unique point. It follows that, when the discount factor is high and depreciation is 
low, all equilibrium steady states are approximately efficient. Third, however, conver-
gence to the steady state is always inefficiently slow. From these results we conclude 
that, with irreversible investments, multiplicity of steady-state equilibria is not prob-
lematic when depreciation is small; and that the problem with dynamic free riding is 
not so much an inefficient steady state, but an inefficiently slow accumulation path. 
Finally, we compare these results with the more commonly studied case with revers-
ible investment. We show that irreversibility has two effects. First, it reduces the set 
of equilibrium steady states that with irreversibility is strictly included in the set with 
reversibility if depreciation is sufficiently small. Second, and more importantly, the 
irreversibility constraint eliminates the inefficient equilibria which, with reversible 
investments, are possible for any level of depreciation, discount factor and group size.
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